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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the developments in labor income taxation in
Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia during the period 2011–2017.
While the systems of social insurance contributions in these coun-
tries were relatively stable, their personal income taxes have
undergone more important changes. Using tax-benefit microsimu-
lation models, we compute average and marginal tax rates for
the sample units and assess the impact of tax-benefit systems on
income distribution.
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1. Introduction
In the context of sluggish economic growth, high unemployment and rising income
inequality, countries in the EU and around the world are implementing tax reforms.
As the series of reports Tax Policy Reforms (OECD, 2016, 2017, 2018a) demonstrates,
some of these reforms provide a fiscal stimulus to ‘spur the GDP growth’, some are
‘enhancing fairness’ by redistributing the tax burden from lower and middle income
classes to higher income classes, and others are ‘encouraging work’ through provision
of tax relief for low-wage workers. According to these reports, each year, a number of
countries introduce larger or smaller changes to their tax systems, searching for the
optimal combination of parameters and adapting to ever-changing internal and exter-
nal circumstances.
Many of these tax changes occur in the field of labor taxes – namely, personal
income taxes (PITs) and social insurance contributions (SICs) – which represent the
most important sources of tax revenues in OECD countries (OECD, 2017), as well as
in the EU (European Commission, 2018b). In its highly influential publication,
OECD provides recipes for policy makers on how to implement successful ‘growth-
oriented tax reform’ (OECD, 2010). The lowering of the tax burden on labor income
can increase labor utilization. The participation rate can be stimulated by lowering
the average tax wedge, which can be achieved by decreasing tax rates, increasing per-
sonal allowances, or introducing ‘make work policies’, such as earned income tax
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credits. Lowering marginal tax rates may be preferable for increasing hours worked.
Reducing the progressivity of the PIT schedule can benefit both the quantity and
quality of labor supply. All these changes, however, have an impact on the distribu-
tion of income, which must also be taken into account.
Having different starting positions and tax reform goals, different countries per-
form opposing changes; e.g., some countries are cutting, while others are raising, their
top PIT rates; some are broadening their PIT and SIC bases, while others are narrow-
ing them. One trend in the OECD countries is to decrease the PIT burden for lower
and middle classes (OECD, 2017). Another trend is the relinquishment of single-rate
PIT systems in EU countries. Namely, in the period from 1994 to 2008, many EU
countries – all of which belonged to the ex-communist bloc – adopted the single-rate
PIT regime. Some of these countries have maintained this system (Bulgaria, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania and Romania), but several of them have abandoned it by intro-
ducing one or two additional marginal rates (Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia).
However, there are ex-communist EU countries that have introduced and maintained
progressive rate schedules throughout the entire period (Croatia, Slovenia, Poland).
In this paper, we analyze the developments in labor income taxation in three of
the above-mentioned countries – Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia – in the period from
2011 to 2017.1 These three countries share similar historical and contemporary ele-
ments. They were part of multinational states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) with
socialist systems. After the collapse of socialism, all three countries thus experienced
not only a transition towards the capitalistic system but also the process of establish-
ing and/or strengthening several institutions required by independent states. While
Slovakia became independent in a peaceful way, Slovenia and Croatia each faced a
war for independence, which was especially severe in Croatia, with long-lasting effects
on social and economic structures. All three countries are members of the EU
(Slovenia and Slovakia are also members of the Euro zone), in which they belong
to a group of relatively small member states that have a GDP per capita below the
EU-28 average.2 Although they have many similarities, these countries have pursued
different economic and fiscal strategies and achieved different outcomes during the
transition and post-transition periods; these strategies and outcomes are further dis-
cussed in this paper. All three countries were affected by a recent economic crisis,
and Croatia especially is faced with longer-term problems of low employment, high
employment, and high relative poverty.
We calculate the tax wedge on employment income using hypothetical and actual
sample data for the three years (2011, 2014 and 2017). The average tax wedge is com-
pared at different levels of employment income across countries and time periods to
reveal how labor taxation systems and their changes impacted the tax burden.
Redistributive effects of fiscal systems are obtained to assess the impact of tax reforms
on income distribution.
The paper presents an ‘illustrated story’ of the developments in the labor taxation
of the three countries in the period during and after the economic crisis. Careful
investigation of the changes in the tax burden on labor gives us insights into the
motivations of policy makers to implement the various reforms. Our results can help
to envisage the impacts of these reforms on the performance of the labor market.
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In all the calculations, we use arithmetic microsimulation models of direct taxes
and cash social benefits. For Croatia, miCROmodA is used (Urban, Bezeredi & Pezer,
2018), while for Slovenia and Slovakia, we employ EUROMOD (Sutherland & Figari,
2013). These models use EU-SILC data on original incomes of persons living in
households and calculate their taxes payable and benefits receivable. These calcula-
tions are performed using the so-called ‘night-after’ perspective, which means that
behavioral responses due to changes in the tax-benefit system are not simulated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methods used
in the research. In section 3, we briefly review the literature that explains the relation-
ship between the tax wedge on employment income and the main indicators of labor
market performance. The tax wedge is a particular focus of Croatian and Slovenian
researchers, as demonstrated by the dozen studies on this topic, some of which are
presented in the review. Section 4 compares the three analyzed countries in terms of
selected economic indicators, such as real GDP per capita, employment, unemploy-
ment and poverty rates (subsection 4.1), and the overall tax structure (subsection
4.2). This comparison is followed by a detailed presentation of the developments in
the SIC and PIT systems (subsection 4.3). Section 5 compares marginal and average
tax wedges in the three countries using the data for a hypothetical single earner at
different wage levels. This comparison serves as an introduction to the analysis of the
tax wedge obtained for sample data on actual employees in Section 6. Section 7 analy-
ses the impact of the tax-benefit system on income distribution. Section 8 contains a
discussion of results and a conclusion.
2. Methods and data
2.1. Data
For Slovenia and Slovakia, calculations of household income, taxes and benefits are
made using EUROMOD H0.34, wherein the sample data are based on the EU-SILC
UDB 2015. For Croatia, we use miCROmodA v1.15; the dataset was obtained by
merging the EUROMOD input data (based on EU-SILC UDB 2015) and EU-SILC
NDB 2015.3 More information on modelling tax-benefit systems in the three coun-
tries and the data samples can be found in EUROMOD Country Reports (Gabik &
Paur, 2017; Kump, Cok & Majcen, 2017; Urban, Bezeredi & Pezer, 2017) and the
‘miCROmodA report’ (Urban et al., 2018).
2.2. Tax wedge calculation
Gross employment income (GEI) comprises the gross earnings obtained by an
employee and consists of taxable and non-taxable components. The taxable compo-
nents serve as a basis for calculation of employer social insurance contributions
(SICER), employee social insurance contributions (SICEE) and personal income taxes
(PIT). The total labor tax comprises the sum of PIT, SICEE and SICER. Total labor
cost is the sum of GEI and SICER. Net employment income equals GEI minus SICEE
minus PIT (i.e., total labor cost minus total labor tax). The average tax wedge (ATW)
is the percentage share of total labor tax in total labor cost. The marginal tax wedge
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(MTW) is obtained as the percentage ratio between the change in the total labor tax
and the change in total labor cost when GEI is marginally increased. The post-SIC
GEI is obtained as the GEI minus SICEE.
PITs and SICs are typically paid to the general government. However, there are
many cases in which these compulsory payments, primarily SICs, are paid to privately
managed funds, welfare agencies, public enterprises or social insurance schemes out-
side the general government. The OECD’s report Taxing Wages includes in the tax
wedge only the compulsory and unrequited payments made to the general govern-
ment (OECD, 2018b). However, OECD also produces alternative measures of the tax
wedge, which capture ‘non-tax compulsory payments’ that are ‘made by employers or
employees in connection with the employees’ labor activity’ (OECD, 2018c).4
In this paper, we follow this alternative approach that considers all compulsory
payments as the components of total labor tax. In Slovenia, all PIT and SIC compo-
nents belong to the general government. Croatia and Slovakia have two-pillar pension
systems: the contributions for the 1st pillar belong to the general government, and
contributions for the 2nd pillar are paid to privately managed pension funds. Some
employees participate in the two-pillar system, while others contribute only to the 1st
pillar. However, the total rates are equal for these two groups, and there is no differ-
ence in the tax wedge measures among these groups.
Another departure from the Taxing Wages methodology in this paper considers
the treatment of cash family benefits. OECD calculates the amounts of tax relief and
cash transfers universally paid with respect to dependent children in certain age
groups and deducts these amounts in the calculation of the tax wedge. In this study,
we disregard these benefits, focusing purely on PITs and SICs. In our concrete case,
Croatia and Slovenia have means-tested child benefits, and Slovakia has a non-
means-tested child benefit. Slovakia has a refundable tax credit for taxpayers with
dependent children; in this case, we take into account both portions of tax credit: the
first one, which reduces or eliminates a taxpayer’s liability, and the second one, which
exceeds the liability and is paid to the taxpayer (‘negative tax’ or tax refund). In the
OECD’s Taxing Wages, the income unit for calculation of the tax wedge is a house-
hold (family). In this investigation, the income unit is an individual employee.
In hypothetical calculations of tax burden, it is usually assumed that the entire
employment income of an employee is taxable. However, in reality, there are parts of
employment income that are exempted from taxation, i.e., they do not enter the base
for calculation of SICs and PITs.5 Using the data on actual income units, we are able
to distinguish taxable and non-taxable portions of employment income. Our microsi-
mulation models recognize these different components and apply the relevant rules in
the calculation of SIC and PIT bases. In their input data sets, EUROMOD and
miCROmodA contain the variables for different components of GEI. Table 1 lists
these components (variables) for the three analyzed countries.
The ‘selected employees’ are persons who have been earning employment income
during all 12months of the year, working at least the usual 30 hours per week, and
with average GEI per month exceeding the gross minimum wage. The original sam-
ples and the models are slightly adapted. All non-employment taxable incomes of
selected employees are set to zero in order to focus on the tax burden on labor
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income. For Slovakia, we also set to zero the amounts of ‘termination pay’ and
‘severance payments’ because these components of GEI represent one-off payments.
Table 2 shows the basic information about samples used in the study. Using
Croatia for illustration, out of 17,135 individuals in the sample, there were 5013
persons who had positive GEI, but 3951 of them – representing 1.06 million
employees – have entered the ‘selected employees’ group. The average GEI is higher
for the selected employees than for all employees because employees who work more
hours and months tend to be better paid; also, the former group excludes employees
with GEI below the minimum wage.
Selected employees are first sorted into permille groups according to GEI, whereby
each permille represents 1/1000 of the employees. Afterwards, the quantile groups are
formed; for example, the quantile group q1–200 (q999–1000) contains 20% (0.2%) of
employees with the lowest (highest) gross employment income.
2.3. Decomposition of inequality effect
Unlike in the analysis of the tax wedge, where the unit of observation was an individ-
ual worker, in the analysis of inequality and redistribution, the unit of observation is
a household. The pre-fiscal income of a household is defined as the sum of gross ori-
ginal incomes and private transfers of all household members. Post-fiscal (or dispos-
able) income equals pre-fiscal income minus taxes plus social benefits. All incomes,
taxes and benefits are equalized using the modified OECD scale. We denote equalized
pre-fiscal income, post-fiscal income, tax p and benefit q, of equalized household i, as
Xi; Yi; Ti;p and Bi;q: Equalized post-fiscal income (Yi) is also referred to as equalized
disposable income.
We use the Kakwani (1984) decomposition of the inequality effect of the fiscal sys-
tem into vertical and horizontal effects. The inequality effect is the difference between
the Gini coefficients of pre-fiscal and post-fiscal incomes, IF ¼ GXGY : The vertical
and horizontal effects equal VF ¼ GXDY and HF ¼ GYDY ; respectively, where DY
is the concentration coefficient of post-fiscal income. The decomposition of the
inequality effect is as follows:
Table 1. Components of gross employment income, as contained in EUROMOD and
miCROmodA, 2014.
Country Component of GEI Variable Taxation Share (%)
Croatia Taxable cash employment income yemtx taxable (SICER, SICEE, PIT) 95.85
Taxable in-kind employment income kfbtx taxable (SICER, SICEE, PIT) 1.28
Non-taxable cash employment income yemnt not taxable 2.82
Non-taxable in-kind employment income kfbnt not taxable 0.05
Slovenia Taxable employment income yemtx taxable (SICER, SICEE, PIT) 93.81
Non-taxable employment income yemnt not taxable 6.19
Slovakia Gross wages yemwg taxable (SICER, SICEE, PIT) 96.61
Employment income – company shares yemcs taxable (SICER, SICEE) 0.03
Employment income – from abroad yemab taxable (PIT) 2.58
Employment income – from agreements yemaj taxable (PIT) 0.32
Other payments made by employers yemot taxable (PIT) 0.34
Fringe benefits except vouchers yfb00 taxable (PIT) 0.13
Note: Column “Share (%)” shows the percentage share of a component in total GEI, as obtained for “selected
employees” (see below for definition) in 2014.
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IF ¼ VF  HF
GXGY ¼ GXDYð Þ GYDYð Þ (1)
VF measures the potential inequality reduction of the fiscal system, i.e., the
decrease of inequality if there were no horizontal inequity. HF measures the extent of
horizontal equity due to reranking of income units and unequal treatment of equal
units. Furthermore, the vertical effect is then decomposed following the method pro-
posed by Lambert (1985, 2001):
VF ¼
P
p 1 /Tp
 
 VTp þ
P
q 1þ /Bq
 
 VBq
1Pp/Tp þ
P
q/
B
q
(2)
where
VTp ¼ GXDXTp
VBq ¼ GXDXþBq
(3)
are vertical effects of the pth tax and qth benefit, respectively; /Tp and /
B
q are their
respective shares in pre-fiscal income; DXTp and DXþBq are the concentration coeffi-
cients obtained for income variables XiTi;p and Xi þ Bi;q; respectively. The contribu-
tions of the pth tax and qth benefit to VF are obtained using Equation (2),
respectively, as:
V Tp
  ¼
1/Tp
 
 VTp
1Pp/Tp þ
P
q/
B
q
V Bqð Þ ¼
1þ /Bq
 
 VBq
1Pp/Tp þ
P
q/
B
q
(4)
3. Importance of the tax wedge
In regard to measurement of the labor tax burden, the most popular indicator is the
‘tax wedge’, which is usually defined as the difference between labor costs to the
employer and the net wage of the employee. The tax wedge is often assessed for
hypothetical income units. The notable example is the OECD’s publication Taxing
Table 2. Basic information about the samples, 2014.
Croatia Slovenia Slovakia
Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population
All individuals 17,135 4,171,488 26,116 2,004,082 16,150 5,223,852
All employees 5,013 1,351,325 10,442 819,198 6,936 2,309,928
Average GEI (EUR) 10,126 17,639 8,464
Selected employees 3,951 1,063,135 7,559 599,004 5,553 1,864,201
Average GEI (EUR) 11,641 21,890 9,543
Notes: “All employees” are persons with positive GEI who have been employed at least one month.
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Wages, which contains international comparisons of the tax wedge for several stand-
ardized types of individuals and families (OECD, 2018b).
The tax wedge for hypothetical income units is used in virtually all studies exploring
how tax burden on employment income affects employment, unemployment and prod-
uctivity of labor. A recurring conclusion of these studies is that a high tax wedge has a det-
rimental impact on the labor market: it decreases employment and labor productivity and
leads to higher unemployment (e.g., Daveri & Tabellini, 2000; Nickell, 2004; Nickell,
Nunziata & Ochel, 2005). For example, using the panel data for EU-27 countries during
the 1999–2008 period, Dolenc and Laporsek (2010) reveal the statistically significant nega-
tive relationship between the tax wedge and employment growth.6 In a recent study,
Lehmann, Lucifora, Moriconi and Van der Linden (2016) confirm the findings of previ-
ous studies that a decrease in the tax wedge is associated with a decrease in unemploy-
ment and an increase in the employment rate. However, these authors also reveal a
positive (negative) relationship between tax wedge progressivity and the employment
(unemployment) rate. It has also been shown that higher progressivity of the tax schedule
decreases production per worker and that the net impact of the tax burden on total pro-
duction is not statistically significant.
The effects of the tax wedge on employment income is a very popular topic among
researchers from the three analyzed countries, particularly Croatia and Slovenia.7
Cok, Grulja, Turk and Verbic (2013) provide detailed calculations of the tax wedge in
Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria and Italy in 2010. In addition to calculating the
tax wedge for the average worker, they also obtain the results for annual wages rang-
ing from 10 to 100,000 euros. When the average worker is considered, Croatia,
Slovenia and Hungary have a lower tax burden than Austria and Italy. This finding is
reversed when tax wedges are obtained for wages expressed in absolute terms.8 Urban
(2016) summarizes the Taxing Wages results regarding the tax wedge for EU OECD
countries, adding the calculations for Croatia.9 It is shown that the Croatian tax
wedge in 2014 is lower than in Slovenia and Slovakia for different hypothetical types,
but the differences are relatively modest. In the analyzed sample, these three countries
belong to the bottom half of the ranking scale.
Several studies have performed cluster analyses for OECD and EU countries
according to the tax wedge and labor market variables (Dolenc, Laporsek &
Separovic, 2011; Dolenc & Vodopivec, 2005; Grdovic Gnip & Tomic, 2010; Separovic,
2009). These studies classify countries into two major groups: (A) those with a higher
tax wedge, higher unemployment and lower employment, and (B) those with a lower
tax wedge, lower unemployment and higher employment. Croatia was often classified
into group A and Slovakia into group B, whereas Slovenia was somewhere between
these two groups. The results of these studies are not clear-cut. For example, the
three countries had relatively similar levels of the tax wedge, but Croatia was catego-
rized into group A simply because it has high unemployment and low employment
rates. In an attempt to improve the model, Grdovic Gnip and Tomic (2010) intro-
duced the index of employment protection legislation as an additional variable, but
the results remained contradictory.10
Deskar-Skrbic, Drezgic and Simovic (2018) analyze the effects of labor taxation in
terms of the tax wedge on employment in Croatia in the period from 2000 to 2016.
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They employ the small-scale vector autoregressive model to show that the shock in
the tax wedge has a negative effect on cyclically adjusted employment. This effect is
statistically significant in five quarters after the shock. Nadoveza, Sekur and Beg
(2016) use the computable general equilibrium model for Croatia to perform an exer-
cise in lowering employer taxes. The results show that: (a) the price of labor is
increased due to increased demand for labor, (b) the price of capital is decreased, (c)
the prices of final goods decrease, (d) household income increases due to an increase
in wages, which more than compensates for the decrease in capital income, (e) pro-
duction of all sectors increases (most in the services sector), and (f) although the
labor tax is lower, government consumption of all goods increases due to higher con-
sumption and household income.
As already mentioned above, virtually all of the studies exploring the relationship
of labor taxation burden and macroeconomic variables (employment, unemployment,
labor productivity) use the tax wedge obtained for hypothetical units. However, as
Immervoll (2004) explains, the tax burden calculations based on hypothetical house-
holds, ‘while illustrative, fail to take into account the heterogeneity of the population.’
He advocates for using a microsimulation model of taxes and benefits, which can cal-
culate the tax wedge for real income units by using the information from the repre-
sentative sample of a country’s population. Immervoll (2004) also provides a detailed
discussion of methodological procedures and challenges in calculating both the aver-
age and marginal tax wedges.
4. Country overview
4.1. Selected economic indicators
In 2005, Croatia and Slovakia had equal real GDP per capita (10,000 euros), which
represented approximately 40% of the EU-28 average (Figure 1). In 2017, Croatian
real GDP per capita was only 13% higher, whereas Slovakia achieved an increase of
52%, which puts it at 54% of the EU average. Slovenia began the period at 67% of
the EU-28 average and ended it with 70%.
The GDP rise in Slovakia was also followed by an increase in the employment rate –
from 64.5% in 2005 to 71.1% in 2017, which is close to the EU-28 average (72.2%).
Slovenia was several points above the EU-28 average in the 2005–2008 period. This advan-
tage disappeared during the economic crisis, and in 2016, Slovenia was at the EU-28 aver-
age. Croatia had a similar pattern in its employment rate during the analyzed period, but
at much lower levels, approximately 8 percentage points below the EU-28 average.
All countries registered their peak unemployment rates in 2013; subsequently, the
rate tends to fall to its pre-crisis level. As in the case of the employment rate in 2017,
Slovenia and Slovakia converge to the EU-28 average, while Croatia performs signifi-
cantly worse. The latter is also true with regard to the poverty headcount rate. In
contrast, Slovenia and Slovakia are well below the EU-28 average of 17% in 2017.
4.2. Tax structure
In terms of the total tax burden as a percentage of GDP, Croatia and Slovenia
stand close to the EU-28 average (Table 3). Additionally, Slovenia has a relatively
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similar structure of tax revenue as the EU-28 average, with somewhat higher reli-
ance on indirect taxes and SICs and lower dependence on direct taxes. Croatia
collects less than Slovenia from both direct taxes and SICs but outperforms in
terms of indirect taxes. Regarding the share of VAT in GDP, Croatia was the high-
est-ranked EU country in 2016. Slovakia has relatively similar shares of direct
taxes and SICs as Croatia and Slovenia but collects significantly less from direct
taxes; its share of VAT in GDP was only 6.7% in 2016, compared to 13% in
Croatia. The total tax burden in Slovakia is significantly lower than in the other
two countries throughout the whole period, especially in 2010, when it was only
28% of GDP.
4.3. Labour income taxation
In this section, we briefly review the main features of labor income taxation in
Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia during the period from 2011 to 2017. We consider
SIC and PIT systems.11 The main parameters of these systems are shown in the
Appendix (Table A1 to A4). Because the average employment income differs in the
three countries, for comparability purposes, we also express the monetary parameters
in terms of the average post-SIC GEI (APSGEI).
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Figure 1. Selected economic indicators.
Source: EUROSTAT (2018).
Notes: (1) Real GDP per capita – real gross domestic product expressed in per capita terms; (2) Employment rate –
the share of persons in employment aged 20 to 64 in the total population of the same age group; (3)
Unemployment rate – the share of the economically active population aged 20 to 64 who has been unemployed; (4)
Poverty rate – the share of persons living in households with equivalised disposable income below 60% of
the median.
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All three countries implement employer and employee SIC (henceforth, SICER
and SICEE, respectively) instruments. The total SICER rate in Slovakia (35.2%) is
twice as high as in Croatia (17.2%) and Slovenia (16.1%). In contrast, Slovakia has a
smaller total SICEE rate (13.4%) than Croatia (20%) and Slovenia (22.1%). The rates
have not been changed during the period 2011–2017.12
The base for calculation of SICs is gross employment income, but there are signifi-
cant differences regarding the ‘ceilings’, i.e., the maximum levels of SIC bases.
Slovenia applies no ceilings at all. Croatia sets the ceiling on the base of SICEE
instruments, which in year y equals 6 average gross wages in the year y–1. Slovakia
applies ceilings based on the majority of SIC instruments, which in year y equal C
average gross wages in year y–2 (Table A4).13
During the analyzed period, Slovakia introduced major changes regarding the ceil-
ings. Namely, in 2011, the factor C ranged from 1.5 to 3 for various SICs. In 2013, C
was raised to 5 and then to 7 in 2017. Furthermore, the ceiling for health insurance
contributions was abolished in 2017. In 2015, the allowance for health insurance con-
tribution was introduced, and it was intended for low-income persons.14
In all three countries, SICEE is exempted from personal income taxation. In other
words, the pre-PIT income equals gross wage minus SICEE. Another common char-
acteristic is the general allowance, which is applicable to all taxpayers. However, its
calculation differs by country. In Croatia, general allowance does not depend on the
pre-PIT income. In Slovenia, taxpayers are divided into three income brackets, and
the amount of allowance falls with pre-PIT income. In Slovakia, the general allowance
is designed in the fashion of a ‘working tax credit’: if pre-PIT income is below the
threshold, the basic amount is obtained; after the threshold, the withdrawal rate
(25%) is applied; at a certain pre-PIT income, the allowance falls to the minimum
level of zero.15
A similar formula is applied in the calculation of the Slovakian allowance for depend-
ent spouse. Contrarily, Croatia and Slovenia have unique values of their allowances for
dependent spouses.16 These two countries have tax allowances for children, whose
Table 3. Tax structure in Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia and the EU-28, % of GDP.
Croatia Slovenia Slovakia EU-28
2004 2010 2016 2004 2010 2016 2004 2010 2016 2004 2010 2016
Indirect taxes 18.8 17.6 19.5 15.5 14.2 14.7 12.2 10.2 10.8 13.1 13.0 13.6
VAT 11.9 11.4 13.0 8.4 8.1 8.2 7.6 6.2 6.7 6.6 6.8 7.0
Taxes and duties on imports
excluding VAT
0.6 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5
Taxes on products, except
VAT and import duties
5.4 4.6 5.2 4.0 4.8 5.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 4.0 3.7 3.8
Other taxes on production 0.9 1.1 1.3 2.8 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.0 2.1 2.1 2.3
Direct taxes 5.9 6.6 6.6 8.1 8.1 7.4 6.4 5.6 7.3 12.4 12.3 13.3
Personal income taxes 3.7 3.5 3.7 5.6 5.6 5.2 3.0 2.6 3.3 8.7 8.9 9.3
Corporate income taxes 1.8 1.9 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.6
Other 0.4 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.3
Social contributions 11.8 11.8 11.7 13.9 14.9 14.5 13.0 12.1 14.1 11.8 12.0 12.1
Employers’ 6.3 6.3 6.2 5.3 5.7 5.5 7.5 6.8 8.0 6.7 6.9 6.8
Households’ 5.5 5.5 5.5 8.7 9.2 8.9 5.4 5.3 6.1 5.1 5.1 5.3
Less: capital transfers na na na 0.1 0.0 0.0 na na na 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total 36.4 35.9 37.8 37.4 37.1 36.6 31.6 28.0 32.2 37.3 37.2 38.9
Source: European Commission (2018a).
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amounts rise for each subsequent child. In relative terms, Croatia has more generous child
tax allowances. For example, in 2017, the total allowance for three children was 123% of
APSGEI, compared to 53% in Slovenia. By contrast, Slovakia has a refundable child tax
credit, whose amount is equal for each additional child. In Slovenia and Slovakia, the gen-
eral allowance and the allowance for dependent children and spouses have been increased
only marginally during the analysed period. By contrast, Croatian amounts have
been doubled.
In the beginning of the analysed period, Slovakia had the simplest PIT system,
with a flat rate of 19%. Croatia and Slovenia had three-rate schedules, with the rate
combinations of 12%–25%–40% and 16%–27%–41%, respectively. In 2013, Slovakia
introduced a second rate of 25%, which captures incomes above four times the aver-
age wage.
In the same year, Slovenia also introduced an additional marginal tax rate (50%)
for high-income taxpayers. The threshold for the third bracket (taxed at 41%) was
increased by one-quarter in the period 2011–2013, which provided a relief for tax-
payers with incomes approximately 1.5 times the average wage. In 2017, the third
bracket was split into two brackets, which are taxed at 34% and 39%, respectively.
Thus, Slovenia ends the period with the five-rate schedule.
Croatia has changed the schedule on three occasions. In 2012, the threshold for
the third bracket – taxed at 40% – was reduced by one-fifth. The 2015 reform repre-
sented a reversal of the preceding change, whereby the threshold for the third bracket
was raised by one-half. In 2017, Croatia took a step further in relaxing the tax burden
for taxpayers with the above-average income: the two rate schedule is introduced –
with 24% and 36% rates – wherein the threshold for the top rate is further increased.
Slovenia and Slovakia do not have local personal income taxes, but Croatia has the
local government ‘surtax’, which is obtained as the amount of PIT multiplied by the
surtax rate. The surtax rate is determined by the city (municipality), and the rates
range from 0% to 18%. The effective average surtax rate is between 10% and 12%.
5. Hypothetical tax wedge
In this section, we analyze the tax wedge in the three countries using the results
obtained for a hypothetical wage earner, who is a single person without dependents.
The graphs in Figure 2 show MTW schedules separately for each country at the
beginning (2011) and end (2017) of the analyzed period. Croatian PIT reforms have
significantly extended the ‘zero’ bracket, i.e., the amount of income that is not taxed
by PIT thanks to the general allowance. However, the abolition of the 12% rate means
that taxpayers with the monthly gross wage in the range from EUR 640 to 900 are
faced with higher MTW, namely 50%. The MTW is considerably decreased—by
Table 4. Mean average tax wedge.
2011 2014 2017 2014–2011 2017–2014
Croatia 37.6 37.7 35.8 0.1 1.9
Slovenia 40.8 40.2 40.1 0.6 0.0
Slovakia 40.1 40.9 41.4 0.8 0.5
Notes: Mean ATW is computed for “selected employees” according to the methodology described in section 2.1. Tax
systems are specified in Section 4.
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12 percentage points—for gross wages between EUR 2100 and 3500. The downward
step at approximately EUR 6200 is due to the ceiling on SICEE.
The graph for Slovenia contains a peculiarity, which requires an explanation.
Recall that the general allowance differs by the incomes of taxpayers, which are put
into three income brackets. When income increases by a small amount, a taxpayer
can move from a lower bracket to a higher one, which causes a reduction of the
allowance and a jump in the PIT obligation that is higher than the increase in
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Figure 2. Marginal tax wedge for a hypothetical wage earner.
Notes: The graphs show MTWs for a hypothetical wage earner (single person without dependants) in 2011 and 2017.
A Surtax rate of 12% is assumed for Croatia. MTW is the percentage ratio between the change in the amount of total
taxes (PITþ SICEEþ SICER) and the change in total labour cost when GEI is increased by a small amount.
Computations are made using EUROMOD and miCROmodA. The exchange rate for Croatian data is HRK/EUR ¼ 7.5 in
all years. MTW is presented only for gross wages exceeding the minimum gross wage. Diamond marks in the graph
for Slovenia denote the MTW exceeding 100%.
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income; this leads to a MTW above 100%. There are two such points in the
Slovenian schedule, and the corresponding MTWs are denoted using the dia-
mond marks.
Because the number of rates has increased from three to five, there are two more
steps in the Slovenian schedule in 2017. Taxpayers with gross income between EUR
2000 and 7900 are faced with lower MTW. However, the MTW rose by more than
six percentage points for those above EUR 7900.
The changes in the ceilings of Slovakian SICs have dramatically increased MTW at
the interval from EUR 3000 to 6000. Another interesting feature of the 2017
Slovakian schedule is a hump for gross wages between EUR 420 and 620. This inter-
val is when the allowance for the health insurance contribution is at work; it is
designed to fall with gross income at a double rate, which causes an additional mar-
ginal tax burden at the mentioned interval.
The graphs in Figure 3 show ATW for hypothetical earners in the three countries
in 2011, 2014 and 2017. Similarly, as in Cok et al. (2013), the ATW is obtained for
an ‘average worker’ and for several absolute values of the monthly gross wage.
However, in this case, the average worker is the one having the average GEI per
month, as obtained for ‘selected employees’ (Table A5 in Appendix).17
In 2014, ATW in Croatia increases in comparison to 2011 for all levels of gross
wages except for EUR 500. This increase is a consequence of the 2012 reform, which
increased the general personal allowance but squeezed the second income bracket.
However, the 2015 and 2017 reforms decreased ATW for all income groups, particu-
larly for gross wages between EUR 3000 and 7500 (by more than five percent-
age points).
Slovenia also decreases ATW for all income groups, but for gross wages up to
EUR 3000, the decline is less than one percentage point. More significant
decreases are made for the highest monthly gross wages – those of EUR 7500 and
10,000 – about 2.5 half percentage points. In 2017, the levels of ATW in Croatia
and Slovenia are quite similar for different gross wages expressed in EUR.
Slovakia has a different pattern of ATW than the aforementioned countries.
Developments during the period are also distinguished. Focusing on 2011, the ATW
is flat and very high for gross wages up to EUR 3000. Beyond that point, the wedge
falls steeply thanks to low SIC ceilings. However, in 2014 and 2017, the ATW signifi-
cantly increases for high-income groups due to the changes in the ceilings. The tax
burden falls only for the lowest wages, which is due to the introduction of the allow-
ance for the health insurance contribution.
The difference in ATW between Croatia (Slovenia) and Slovakia for the highest
gross incomes fell from 25 to fewer than 10 percentage points during the period
of study.
6. Empirical tax wedge
Figure 4 presents the median MTW, which is obtained separately for each quantile
group. The highest median MTW – of all subgroups shown in the figure – is for
the Slovenian top 0.2% of employees (income group q999–1000) in 2014 and
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2017. This figure amounts to 66%, which means that two-thirds of the marginal
increase in the employers’ outlays go to the general government. In contrast, the
lowest MTW for the top 0.2% of employees is observed in Slovakia 2011, at
‘only’ 36%.
Croatia and Slovenia introduced PIT reforms that decreased marginal tax rates.
However, when the final year of the period (2017) is compared to the starting year
(2011), neither of the two countries has achieved a lower median MTW for all quan-
tile groups. Namely, Croatia has a higher median MTW for groups q401–600 and
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Figure 3. Average tax wedge for a hypothetical wage earner.
Notes: The graph shows ATW for a hypothetical wage earner—a single person without dependants. AGEI represents
the average GEI per month. A surtax rate of 12% is assumed for Croatia. At each level of monthly gross wage, ATW is
obtained as the percentage share of total taxes (SICERþ SICEEþ PIT) in total labour cost (gross wageþ SICER).
Computations are made using EUROMOD and miCROmodA. The exchange rate for Croatian data is HRK/EUR ¼ 7.5 in
all years.
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q601–800, which is due to replacement of the 12% PIT rate with the 24% rate in
2017. Slovenia has a higher median MTW for the group q999–1000 thanks to the
introduction of the 50% top marginal rate in 2013. By increasing the levels of SIC
ceilings, Slovakia has significantly increased MTW for the top 1% of employees, from
36% in 2011 to 52% in 2017.
As a consequence of all these changes, the Slovakian mean ATW has increased by
1.3 percentage points during the period, and in 2017, it is higher than the Slovenian
mean ATW (Table 4). Croatia has the lowest mean ATW during the whole period,
particularly in 2017.
Figure 5 shows the median ATWs obtained for quantile groups in the three coun-
tries.18 When 2017 is compared to 2011, Croatia and Slovakia represent complete
opposites: the former (the latter) country decreased (increased) ATWs for all quantile
groups. The largest decreases are observed for the top 1% of employees in Croatia –
five percentage points. At the same time, the median ATW for the group q999–1000
in Slovakia increases by six percentage points.
PIT reforms have ensured that Croatia remains a country with the lowest ATW
for the bottom 90% of employees. Regarding the top 0.2% of employees (q999-
q1000), the difference between Croatia and Slovakia fell from 12.6 percentage points
in 2011 to only 1.7 percentage points in 2017.
Despite all the changes in the PIT system, the Croatian tax wedge remained pro-
gressive, which is evidenced by the increasing slope of the median ATW curve
(Figure 5). However, the progressivity – measured by the difference between the
median ATW for the highest and the lowest quantile groups – has decreased by four
percentage points. The opposite has occurred in Slovakia, which has increased the
progressivity of ATW; the difference between the highest and the lowest quantile
groups rose from 4 (2011) to 10 (2017) percentage points.
7. Income redistribution
In this section, we analyse the impact of tax-benefit systems on income distribution
in the three countries at the household level. The methodology for calculating
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Figure 4. Median marginal tax wedge by quantile groups.
Notes: MTW is computed for “selected employees” according to the methodology described in section 2.1. Tax sys-
tems are specified in section 4.
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redistributive effects is explained in Section 2.3. Pre-fiscal income is the sum of ori-
ginal incomes, public pensions and private transfers. Original incomes are inclusive
of all SICs, which implies the assumption that employees bear the whole burden of
direct taxes, i.e., SICER, SICEE and PIT. The inclusion of public pensions into pre-
fiscal income means that we treat them not as social benefits but as equivalent to
market incomes. Incomes, taxes and benefits are equalized using the ‘modified OECD
scale’, which appoints the value of 1.0 to the first adult in a household, 0.5 to all
other adults, and 0.3 to children.19
Table 5 shows the results that are obtained for the 2011, 2014 and 2017 tax-benefit
systems. First, note the significant differences among the three countries in pre-fiscal
income inequality: it is highest in Croatia (GX0:39), followed by Slovenia
(GX0:35) and Slovakia (GX0:29).
In 2011, the vertical effect of the fiscal system (VF) is highest in Slovenia (0.1142),
followed by Croatia (0.0997) and Slovakia (0.0965). The horizontal effect (HF) is
somewhat higher in Slovenia (0.0147) and Slovakia (0.0132) than in Croatia (0.0100).
As in the case of the vertical effect, the highest inequality effect (IF) is in Slovenia
(0.0095), followed by Croatia (0.0897) and Slovakia (0.0833).
The decomposition of the vertical effect shows that taxes on labor income (SICER,
SICEE and PIT) are major contributors to income inequality reduction. As a package,
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Figure 5. Median average tax wedge by quantile groups.
Notes: ATW is computed for “selected employees” according to the methodology described in section 2.1. Tax systems
are specified in section 4.
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in 2011, their vertical effect represents 16.3%, 18.6% and 20.6% of the vertical effect
of the fiscal systems in Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia, respectively. The contribution
of SICs remains constant during the analyzed period in Croatia and Slovenia but rises
in Slovakia due to the increase in SIC ceilings.
In Slovakia, the contribution of PIT remains constant during the period of ana-
lysis, despite the introduction of the 25% top rate. The reason for this neutrality may
lie in the fact that the increased progressivity of SICEE has decreased the inequality
of pre-PIT income and consequently the progressivity of PIT. The contribution of
Croatian PIT has risen in 2014 compared to 2011 due to the 2012 reform, but the
2015 and 2017 reforms have significantly reduced its vertical strength, primarily
because the share of PIT has fallen from 5% to only 4% of pre-fiscal income. In
Slovenia, the contribution of PIT has been decreasing: the impact of tax-burden relax-
ation for above-average incomes was stronger than the impact of the higher burden
for top incomes.
In comparison to 2014, the vertical effect of fiscal systems in 2017 is lower in
Croatia (by 0.008) and Slovenia (by 0.004), whereas the decline in Slovakia is negli-
gible. Consequently, the difference in post-fiscal income inequality between Croatia
Table 5. Redistributive effects of fiscal systems.
Croatia Slovenia Slovakia
2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017
Income inequality and concentration indices
GX 0.3940 0.3921 0.3956 0.3508 0.3503 0.3517 0.2944 0.2940 0.2982
DY 0.2943 0.2907 0.3025 0.2366 0.2315 0.2372 0.1979 0.1978 0.2024
GY 0.3043 0.3006 0.3112 0.2513 0.2457 0.2513 0.2112 0.2128 0.2170
Vertical, horizontal and inequality effects of the fiscal system
VF 0.0997 0.1014 0.0931 0.1142 0.1187 0.1145 0.0965 0.0963 0.0958
HF 0.0100 0.0099 0.0087 0.0147 0.0141 0.0141 0.0132 0.0150 0.0146
IF 0.0897 0.0915 0.0844 0.0995 0.1046 0.1004 0.0833 0.0813 0.0812
Contributions of taxes and benefits to the vertical effect of the fiscal system
SICER 0.0181 0.0180 0.0178 0.0148 0.0147 0.0141 0.0306 0.0321 0.0337
SICEE 0.0207 0.0207 0.0204 0.0161 0.0167 0.0158 0.0114 0.0132 0.0138
SICSE 0.0024 0.0024 0.0021 0.0032 0.0031 0.0035 0.0034 0.0042 0.0038
PIT 0.0256 0.0281 0.0218 0.0344 0.0319 0.0296 0.0187 0.0182 0.0186
PPT 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
CB 0.0124 0.0120 0.0106 0.0118 0.0098 0.0095 0.0069 0.0065 0.0057
OFAB 0.0040 0.0039 0.0036 0.0053 0.0052 0.0049 0.0084 0.0085 0.0082
SAHB 0.0125 0.0123 0.0126 0.0099 0.0199 0.0216 0.0202 0.0183 0.0159
UHB 0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0140 0.0138 0.0133 0.0019 0.0019 0.0020
OTHB 0.0050 0.0049 0.0046 0.0120 0.0110 0.0102 0.0029 0.0029 0.0027
Shares of taxes and benefits in the pre-fiscal income (%)
SICER 10.2 10.1 10.2 9.7 9.7 9.6 18.3 18.4 18.3
SICEE 11.8 11.8 11.9 13.7 13.9 13.6 6.9 7.4 7.3
SICSE 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.4 4.0 4.1
PIT 5.4 5.4 4.0 8.4 7.9 7.8 4.7 4.6 5.1
PPT 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
CB 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8
OFAB 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.3
SAHB 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0
UHB 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
OTHB 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Notes: Income inequality and concentration indices are defined in section 2.3. Vertical, horizontal and inequality
effects of the fiscal system are obtained using equation (1). The contributions of taxes and benefits to the vertical
effect of the fiscal system are obtained using equation (4). PPT – personal property taxes, CB – child benefits, OFAB
– other family benefits, SAHB – social assistance and housing benefits, UHB – unemployment and health benefits,
OTHB – other benefits.
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and the other two countries becomes even larger; GY equals 0.311 in Croatia 2017,
which is 44% and 23% higher than in Slovakia and Slovenia, respectively.20
8. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed developments in labor taxation in Croatia, Slovenia and
Slovakia during the 2011–2017 period. All three countries were quite active in
reforming their tax systems, but the underlying motivation, the scope of changes, and
the impacts on the labor tax burden were different. Using microsimulation models
and EU-SILC data, we provided detailed insights into the changes in marginal and
average tax wedges and income inequality that were induced by the PIT and
SIC reforms.
The least-reformed country was Slovenia, which increased the number of marginal
PIT rates from three (16–27–41 percent) in 2012 to five (16–27–34–39–50 percent) in
2017. The top rate of 50% applies to taxpayers with income more than four times the
average wage. The new tax schedule brings modest relief to the tax burden (by two
percentage points of ATW) for employees between the 80th and 99th percentiles of
wage distribution. The average tax wedge remained stable during the period, but the
progressivity of PIT was slightly reduced.
Slovakia abandoned its flat-rate PIT in 2013 to introduce a two-rate system (19–25
percent), wherein the top rate captures employees with income more than four times
the average wage. However, a much larger impact on the labor tax burden was cre-
ated by the changes in the SIC system, wherein the base ceilings (applicable to almost
all types of SICs, both employee and employer) have been significantly increased,
from four to seven gross wages. These changes increased the ATW of the top 0.2% of
employees by seven percentage points during the period. However, because the tar-
geted group is quite small, the effect on tax progressivity was very modest. The ATW
has increased for all income groups by 1.3 percentage points on average, which is the
consequence of rising wages combined with fixed amounts of personal allowances
and other forms of relief.
The most comprehensive changes occurred in Croatia, which in 2017 replaced its
three-rate PIT (12–25–40 percent) with the two-rate system (24–36 percent). This
change was coupled with substantial increases in personal allowances and the thresh-
old for the top marginal rate. The top percentile group of employees has seen a
decrease in ATW of approximately five percentage points, with an overall average
decrease in ATW of two percentage points. Although the average burden was reduced
for all income groups, some of them experienced a rise in the MTW, namely, those
between the 40th and 60th percentiles; this increase was due to abolition of the 12%
marginal PIT rate. The rise in disposable income inequality (due to the fall of vertical
effect of PIT) was not dramatic, approximately 0.6 Gini points.
Evidently, the motivations underlying the reforms in the three countries were dif-
ferent. Behind the decreases in marginal tax rates for the upper-middle classes
(Slovenia) and top income classes (Croatia) was a desire of policy makers to improve
the work incentives of employees in these groups. Such measures decrease total gov-
ernment revenue, and Slovenia could compensate by taxing more top-income
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employees, which could also improve PIT progressivity. By contrast, one of Croatia’s
obvious goals was to provide fiscal stimulus, and the government renounced a consid-
erable share of PIT revenue.21 Slovakia was primarily dealing with ‘fairness’ issues but
also succeeded in raising more tax revenue.
Slovakia and Slovenia have much lower disposable income inequality than Croatia.
The ‘pro-rich’ changes of Croatian PIT have further increased this gap, which might
create future incentives for policy makers to revert the PIT system. However, the ana-
lysis indicates that such changes would have only limited effects on income distribu-
tion. While Croatia has similar redistributive effects of the fiscal system as the other
two countries, it has much higher inequality of pre-fiscal income, which, in our ana-
lysis, consists of original incomes and pensions. To lower the inequality of pre-fiscal
income, Croatia should continue pursuing policies oriented to increasing the employ-
ment rate – by lowering unemployment, by encouraging able-to-work inactive per-
sons to enter the labor force, and by preventing early retirement.
By analysing these three countries together, we gained an understanding of the
processes involved and how particular policy measures led to different outcomes in
countries with relatively similar backgrounds. This information would not be possible
to obtain in a single-country analysis or in an analysis of a panel of many countries.
The latter type of analysis would require the researchers to focus only on major view-
points, while the feature of country similarity would be lost. We believe that for the
purpose of our analysis it is better to compare similar countries rather than those
that are distant in geographical, socio-economic and demographic terms. This belief
relates to the question ‘What can we learn from our neighbors in terms of policy
design?’ From the Croatian perspective, for example, the candidates for such a com-
parison could also be Austria, Italy or Serbia. However, in Croatian domestic policy
discussions it is very common to find Slovenia and Slovakia (rather than the other
countries mentioned) being used as the benchmarks and role models. In this respect,
this research has provided many details that go well beyond the typical discussions
about the economic and policy differences among the three countries. Future research
can utilize more heterogeneous country samples.
Notes
1. Income from regular employment is covered, whereas income from self-employment and
occasional work based on one-time contracts is not included.
2. In 2017, GDP at current market prices (in billion EUR, PPP) was 76 in Croatia, 52 in
Slovenia and 125 in Slovakia. GDP per capita in PPP was 61 in Croatia, 85 in Slovenia
and 77 Slovakia (EU 28¼ 100) (EUROSTAT, 2019).
3. EU-SILC NDB 2015 is the national database, collected by the Croatian Bureau of
Statistics through the Income and Living Conditions Survey (Croatian original name:
Anketa o dohotku stanovnistva). It serves as a basis for building EU-SILC UDB 2015.
4. Defined as ,,requited and unrequited compulsory payments to privately-managed funds,
welfare agencies or social insurance schemes outside general governments and to public
enterprises“. The term non-tax compulsory payments should not be confused with non-
taxable employment income, which represents the components of employment income
that are exempted from taxation by SICs and PITs. See below for more on the
latter term.
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5. These are usually work-related allowances paid to employees, such as travel-to-work and
cost-of-meal compensations. They also include vacation and holiday supplements, gifts to
newborn children, etc.
6. Nevertheless, the effect is relatively mild: an increase in the tax wedge by one percentage
point is associated with a decrease in employment growth by 0.04 (0.08) percentage
points for EU-27 (12 new member states). Qualitatively and quantitatively similar results
were obtained by Zimcık (2017) for 26 OECD countries in the 2000–2016 period.
7. The same can be said for researchers from other countries in the former Yugoslavia. For
example, see Mojsoska-Blazevski (2012), Rand-elovic and Zarkovic Rakic, (2013) and
Zarkovic Rakic (2015).
8. For the average worker, Slovenia had a higher tax wedge than Croatia; the reverse is true
for all absolute levels of gross annual wages (10, 20, 30, 50 and 100 thousand euros).
9. Croatia is not an OECD member.
10. Several countries with a high index of employment protection legislation and a high tax
wedge were classified into the group containing low unemployment and high
employment countries, and vice versa. Grdovic Gnip and Tomic, (2010) have also
calculated a tax wedge that combines the burden of PIT, employee SIC and value added
(VAT), but they did not perform further analysis.
11. In this review, we concentrate on taxation of employment income; for more details on
other aspects of taxation, see EUROMOD Country Reports (see references in section 2.1).
12. The exception is the Croatian “general health contribution”, whose rate from May 2012
to March 2014 equalled 13%; before and after this period, the rate was 15%. Following
EUROMOD practice, we consider only the rules valid in June 30 of each respective year.
13. There is no ceiling for the “accident insurance contribution”.
14. For a wage earner, the allowance is obtained as the difference between the gross
minimum wage and the double difference between gross employment income and the
gross minimum wage.
15. The threshold and the basic amount are determined using the “minimum subsistence
level”, which equalled EUR 185.38 in 2011, and EUR 198.09 since 2014.
16. In Slovenia, this allowance also applies to dependent parents. In Croatia, the coverage
extends to virtually all dependent relatives (except children).
17. Here again we diverge from the Taxing Wages methodology, which, among other things,
takes into account only those employees in certain sectors of economy (OECD, 2018b).
Their average gross earnings for Slovenia and Slovakia in 2017 are EUR 18,904 and
11,426, respectively.
18. Additional results are given in the Appendix. Table A5 shows the mean ATR by quantile
groups. Figure A1 shows mean ATR for each quantile groups, as well as the 10th, 50th
and 90th percentile values.
19. Children are persons aged 0 to 13 years. Adults are persons aged 14 or more years.
20. The same trend is observed for ,,potential“post-fiscal income inequality (i.e., one that
would be achieved in the absence of horizontal inequity), which is measured by DY :
21. Despite the substantial lowering of the tax wedge in the 2015–2017 period, domestic
stakeholders in Croatia – including government, employers, unions, economic analysts,
etc. – still seem to believe that the tax wedge is “too high”. In 2018, the Croatian
Ministry of Finance prepared proposals for changes to the PIT and SIC laws in the
direction of even lower labour tax burdens. The proposal includes the raising of the
threshold for the top PIT rate from HRK 210,000 to 360,000. The combined SICER rate
should be decreased from 17.2% to 16.5%.
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Appendix
Table A1. Basic information on taxation of employment income in Croatia, 2011–2017.
2011 2014 2017
HRK % APSGEI HRK % APSGEI HRK % APSGEI
APSGEI 68,732 100 70,382 100 75,718 68,732
Gross
minimum wage
33,768 40 36,216 41 39,312 33,768
SIC
SICER total rate 17.2% 17.2% 17.2%
SICER ceiling na na na na na na
SICEE total rate 20% 20% 20%
SICEE ceiling 551,304 802 571,752 812 557,208 736
PIT
General allowance
Income
bracket 1
0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1
Amount 1 21,600 31 26,400 38 45,600 60
Income
bracket 2
na na na na na na
Amount 2 na na na na na na
Income
bracket 3
na na na na na na
Amount 3 na na na na na na
Allowances
for dependants
Spouse 10,800 16 13,200 19 21,000 28
1 child 10,800 16 13,200 19 21,000 28
2 children 25,920 38 31,680 45 51,000 67
3 children 47,520 69 58,080 83 93,000 123
Schedule: income
brackets (rates)
Bottom 0–43,200 (12%) 0–63 (12%) 0–26,400 (12%) 0–38 (12%) 0–210,000 (24%) 0–277 (24%)
Middle 1 43,200–129,600
(25%)
63–189 (25%) 26,400–105,600
(25%)
38–150 (25%)
Middle 2
Middle 3
Top >129,600 (40%) >189 (40%) >105,600 (40%) >150 (40%) >210,000 (36%) >277 (36%)
Notes: Information compiled from EUROMOD Country Reports (Urban et al., 2017). Yearly amounts of general allow-
ance and income brackets, where applicable, are transformed into monthly amounts. These amounts are also
expressed in terms of the country’s APSGEI. Not shown is the local government surtax (see section 4.3).
Table A2. Basic information on taxation of employment income in Slovenia, 2011–2017.
2011 2014 2017
EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI
APSGEI 17,150 100 17,352 100 17,896 100
Gross
minimum wage
8,976 41 9,468 43 9,660 43
SIC
SICER total rate 16.1% 16.1% 16.1%
SICER ceiling na na na na na na
(continued)
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Table A2. Continued.
2011 2014 2017
EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI
SICEE total rate 22.1% 22.1% 22.1%
SICEE ceiling na na na na na na
PIT
General allowance
Income
bracket 1
0–10,343 0–60 0–10,866 0–63 0–11,166 0–62
Amount 1 6,209 36 6,520 38 6,520 36
Income
bracket 2
10,343–11,965 60–70 10,866–12,571 63–72 11,166–12,571 62–72
Amount 2 4,206 25 4,419 25 4,419 25
Income
bracket 3
> 11,965 > 70 > 12,571 > 72 > 12,571 > 70
Amount 3 275 18 275 19 275 18
Allowances
for dependants
Spouse 2,320 14 2,437 14 2,437 14
1 child 2,320 14 2,437 14 2,437 14
2 children 4,841 28 5,086 29 5,086 28
3 children 9,047 53 9,505 55 9,505 53
Schedule: income
brackets (rates)
Bottom 0–7,634 (16%) 0–44 (16%) 0–8,021 (16%) 0–46 (16%) 0–8,021 (16%) 0–45 (16%)
Middle 1 7,634–15,269
(27%)
44–88 (27%) 8,021–18,960
(27%)
46–109 (27%) 8,021–20,400
(27%)
45–114 (27%)
Middle 2 18,960–70,907
(41%)
109–409 (41%) 20,400–48,000
(34%)
114–268 (34%)
Middle 3 48,000–70,907
(39%)
268–396 (39%)
Top >15,269 (41%) >88 (41%) >70,907 (50%) >409 (50%) >70,907 (50%) >396 (50%)
Notes: Information compiled from EUROMOD Country Reports (Kump et al., 2017). Yearly amounts of general allow-
ance and income brackets, where applicable, are transformed into monthly amounts. These amounts are also
expressed in terms of the country’s APSGEI.
Table A3. Basic information on taxation of employment income in Slovakia, 2011–2017.
2011 2014 2017
EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI
APSGEI 7,631 100 8,276 100 9,134 100
Gross
minimum wage
3,804 44 4,224 44 4,860 46
SIC
SICER total rate 35.2% 35.2% 35.2%
SICER ceiling 35,760 469 48,300 584 72,072 789
SICEE total rate 13.4% 13.4% 13.4%
SICEE ceiling 35,760 469 48,300 584 72,072 789
PIT
General allowance
Income
bracket 1
0–18,551 0–243 0–19,800 0–239 0–19,800 0–217
Amount 1 3,564 47 3,804 46 3,804 42
Income
bracket 2
18,551–32,807 243–430 19,800–35,016 239–423 19,800–35,016 217–383
Amount 2 0 < x < 3,564 0 < x < 47 0 < x < 3,804 0 < x < 46 0 < x < 3,804 0 < x < 42
Income
bracket 3
> 32,807 > 430 > 35,016 > 423 > 35,016 > 383
Amount 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
(continued)
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Table A3. Continued.
2011 2014 2017
EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI EUR % APSGEI
Allowances
for dependants
Spouse 3,564 47 3,804 46 3,804 42
1 child 240 3 252 3 252 3
2 children 480 6 516 6 516 6
3 children 720 9 768 9 768 8
Schedule: income
brackets (rates)
Bottom 0–1 (19%) 0–1 (19%) 0–35,022 (19%) 0–423 (19%) 0–35,022 (19%) 0–383 (19%)
Middle 1
Middle 2
Middle 3
Top >35,022 (25%) >423 (25%) >35,022 (25%) >383 (25%)
Notes: Information compiled from EUROMOD Country Reports (Gabik & Paur, 2017). Yearly amounts of general allow-
ance and income brackets, where applicable, are transformed into monthly amounts. These amounts are also
expressed in terms of the country’s APSGEI.Refundable tax credit.
Table A4. Rates and ceilings of social insurance contributions.
Rate (%) Ceiling (factor C)
SICER SICEE 2011 2014 2017
Croatia
General health 15 – – – –
Occupational health 0.5 – – – –
Unemployment 1.7 – – – –
Pension – 20 6 6 6
Total (Croatia) 17.2 20
Slovenia
Pension and disability 8.85 15.5 – – –
Health 6.56 6.36 – – –
Occupational disease and employment injury 0.53 – – – –
Unemployment 0.06 0.14 – – –
Maternity leave 0.10 0.1 – – –
Total (Slovenia) 16.1 22.1
Slovakia
Old-age 14 4 4 5 7
Disability 3 3 4 5 7
Unemployment 1 1 4 5 7
Sickness 1.4 1.4 1.5 5 7
Reserve solidarity fund 4.75 – 4 5 7
Guarantee 0.25 – 1.5 5 7
Accident 0.8 – – – –
Health insurance 10 4 3 5 –
Total (Slovakia) 35.2 13.4
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Table A5. Average annual gross employment income and mean average tax wedge by quan-
tile groups.
(a) Croatia
Average GEI (EUR) Mean average tax wedge (%)
Quantile group 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 2014–2011 2017–2014
All 11,368 11,641 12,522 37.6 37.7 35.8 0.1 1.9
q1–200 5,858 6,034 6,533 33.1 32.4 31.1 0.8 1.3
q201–400 7,528 7,711 8,312 34.2 33.4 31.7 0.8 1.7
q401–600 9,506 9,773 10,521 34.6 34.2 32.8 0.4 1.4
q601–800 12,815 13,143 14,099 36.3 36.5 34.9 0.3 1.6
q801–900 15,883 16,244 17,424 38.7 39.3 37.7 0.6 1.6
q901–950 20,252 20,720 22,210 40.8 41.1 39.4 0.4 1.8
q951–990 28,479 29,056 31,145 44.5 45.7 42.3 1.1 3.4
q991–998 43,890 44,778 47,998 50.8 51.8 45.9 1.0 6.0
q999–1000 80,745 82,380 88,303 54.2 54.8 49.7 0.6 5.1
(b) Slovenia
Average GEI (EUR) Mean average tax wedge (%)
Quantile group 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 2014–2011 2017–2014
All 21,635 21,890 22,576 40.8 40.2 40.1 0.6 0.0
q1–200 11,525 11,692 12,046 33.6 33.0 33.3 0.6 0.3
q201–400 14,782 14,971 15,427 36.0 35.7 35.9 0.3 0.2
q401–600 18,577 18,807 19,381 37.9 37.6 37.8 0.3 0.2
q601–800 23,600 23,879 24,620 39.8 39.4 39.7 0.4 0.3
q801–900 29,962 30,299 31,254 42.5 41.5 41.7 1.0 0.2
q901–950 37,007 37,456 38,598 45.2 43.9 43.5 1.3 0.4
q951–990 51,500 52,162 53,690 49.7 48.5 47.0 1.2 1.4
q991–998 92,350 92,889 106,390 54.1 53.8 53.5 0.3 0.3
q999–1000 152,430 153,996 158,910 57.0 58.7 57.1 1.7 1.5
(c) Slovakia
Average GEI (EUR) Mean average tax wedge (%)
Quantile group 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 2014–2011 2017–2014
All 8,738 9,543 10,520 40.1 40.9 41.4 0.8 0.5
q1–200 5,519 6,033 6,669 37.6 38.2 37.7 0.6 0.5
q201–400 6,855 7,484 8,247 39.1 39.9 40.6 0.7 0.7
q401–600 7,782 8,497 9,365 39.6 40.4 41.1 0.8 0.7
q601–800 9,286 10,139 11,173 40.8 41.5 42.0 0.6 0.6
q801–900 11,266 12,299 13,552 41.3 42.0 42.5 0.6 0.5
q901–950 13,923 15,197 16,740 40.9 41.7 42.2 0.8 0.4
q951–990 18,138 19,798 21,801 42.3 43.3 43.7 1.1 0.4
q991–998 28,128 30,701 33,805 41.0 43.2 43.7 2.2 0.5
q999–1000 44,585 48,668 53,599 40.4 45.9 47.3 5.5 1.5
Notes: Average GEI and ATW are computed for “selected employees” according to the methodology described in
section 2.2. Tax systems are specified in section 4.
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Figure A1. Mean and median average tax wedge by quantile groups.
Notes: ATW is computed for “selected employees” according to the methodology described in section 2.1. Tax systems
are specified in section 4.
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